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Abstract: This paper analyses the effects of employment condition and work hours on the 
utilisation of primary care services in Italy. Although the Italian NHS provides free and 
equitable access to primary care, type of occupation and labour contracts may still deter 
workers to attend medical appointments. The hypothesis is that the higher the workers’ 
opportunity cost in terms of earning forgone, the less the demand for General Practitioner 
(GP) visits. Using survey data provided by the Italian National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT), 
we estimate a negative binomial model of GP visits as a function of employment related 
variables, individual characteristics, supply factors and geographical effects. We find that self-
employed workers, managers and cadres have relatively low demand compared to white and 
blue collars. We conclude that the former, bearing higher opportunity costs, suffer more from 
the loss of earnings related to the absence from work than the latter.  
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1. Introduction 
The Italian National Health system (NHS) provides free and equitable access 
to primary care at the point of delivery to all residents. Resources are 
allocated in relation to need and GPs are paid according to a capitation fee. 
Although financial- and need- related factors do not represent an actual 
individual constraint to the consumption of health care, some non-financial 
factors, such as occupational status and time work, may still discourage the 
use of GP services in the absence of out-of-pocket prices. In fact, workers 
whose time is most valuable may use medical services less because of higher 
opportunity costs [Becker, 1965; Phelps et al., 1974; Acton, 1975; Grossman, 
1982]. For example, it is likely that employees who are entitled to receive 
sickness subsidy have a lower time price compared to self-employed who 
are not insured against earning losses. Moreover, other contractual 
conditions such as performance-related pay mechanisms and promotion 
systems may carry out additional opportunity costs for taking time off to 
attend medical appointments. Therefore, the more costly is in terms of 
earning losses the absence from work due to illness the less likely the 
recourse to the GP services.  
Little evidence exists about this issue compared to the amount of research 
focusing on individual (demographic, socio-economic characteristics, health 
status) and system (geographic location, waiting times, supply) 
determinants of utilisation across different health care systems [Andersen, 
1995; Wagstaff et al, 2000; Gravelle et al., 2003; Fernández-Olano et al., 
2006]. This abundant strand of literature finds that income is the main 
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determinant of utilisation to private health care systems after controlling for 
need. However, it does not appear to play a role in publicly founded health 
care system [Van Doorsaler et al, 2004].  
Most of studies focusing on the effect of non-monetary factors investigate 
the ‘time required’ on the use of primary care services, including travelling, 
waiting and treatment [Janssen, 1992; Boaz et al., 1989 among others]. By 
contrast, few studies focus on the ‘value of time’ allocated to obtaining 
medical care [Wellstood et al., 2006; Fell et al., 2007; Economou et al., 2008]. 
Rachel et al. (1989) find that retirement increases the number of physician 
visits compared with full-time self-employed. Among the most recent 
studies, Fell et al. (2007) show that individuals with long work hours have 
significantly lower GP utilisation rates compared with full-time workers. 
Furthermore, white collar workers with long work hours seem to visit a GP 
significantly less often than white collar workers with regular hours. 
Economou et al. (2008) find that the unemployed and individuals out of the 
labour force visit the GP more often and that individuals working overtime 
exhibit a lower likelihood of attending medical appointments in comparison 
with their unemployed counterparts.  
In this paper we study the effect of employment status and work hours on 
the demand for GP visits in Italy. The underlying hypothesis is that 
utilisation (U) depends on health status (H), occupational status (E), work 
hours (W) and other variables (X): U = f H ,E,W ,X( ). Different types of 
occupation and the related contractual conditions may lead to different 
effects on the demand for GP visits made by self-employed and employees. 
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Specifically, we expect to find that workers who bear higher opportunity 
costs in terms of earning losses, visit the GP less compared to other 
categories that are unlikely to lose earnings being fully protected by the 
sickness security law. Furthermore, we expect that the higher the total 
number of work hours, the stronger the disutility of visiting the GP suffered 
from workers who have a greater value of time.  
We find that self-employed, managers and cadres (upper white collars), 
bearing higher opportunity costs, have a relatively low demand for primary 
care services compared to the white and blue collars. Specifically, self-
employed workers, being the “residual claimants” of  the produced output, 
fully internalise the costs of being absent from work. Similarly, managers 
and cadres response to performance related pay schemes, leads to a 
reduction in the number of working hours lost in order to minimize their 
income losses.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the ISTAT dataset we 
use and provides descriptive statistics. In section 3 we undertake empirical 
verification by estimating different specifications explaining the effects of 
employment conditions and work hours on the demand of GP visits. Section 
4 offers some concluding remarks. 
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2. Data and methodology 
The data used in this study come from the 2004/2005 Italian Survey on 
“Health conditions and recourse to health services” provided by ISTAT. This 
is the most recent available survey based on a representative sample drawn 
in two stages, including 50,474 households for a total of 128,040 individuals. 
The survey collects a wide range of information on both demographic and 
socio-economic characteristics of individuals and households, as well as 
variables on health conditions and health care utilisation. Regional supply-
side variables extracted from the “Health for All” dataset provided by ISTAT 
are also used. We restrict the sample to working-age individuals (aged 15-
65). This leaves 86,185 observations used in the first step of the analysis to 
assess the effect of employment status on the GP utilization. Afterwards, we 
further restrict the sample to the employed, ending up with a total of 49,536 
individuals, to test the hypothesis that a higher opportunity cost of time 
measured by work hours reduces the demand for primary care services.  
The dependent variable is the total count of GP visits occurred in the latest 
four weeks immediately prior to the interview (Table 1). It is worthwhile to 
note that, with data at hand, we expect that a higher number of respondents 
have no utilisation. Mean values of GP visits in the overall sample and in the 
sub-sample are 0.21 (not shown) and 0.18, respectively. The distribution of 
the number of visits reveals a large proportion of zeros in the sub-sample 
(85%) and a small proportion of individuals who use the GP more 
frequently. The sample variance (0.31) is greater than the sample mean 
indicating that the data exhibit overdispersion. This characteristic may be 
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due to excess zeros, unexplained heterogeneity [Mullahy, 1986] and/or 
temporal dependency.  
[INSERT TABLE 1] 
The highly skewed nature of the data (Figure 1) makes traditional OLS 
estimators inappropriate to model medical visits [Cameron et al, 1998]. To 
overcome this problem, two main traditions of econometric modelling use 
either one-step (Negative Binomial, Zero-Inflated models) or two-step 
estimators (hurdle-models) depending on the theoretical approaches they 
are based upon, namely the Grossman [Grossman, 1982; Duan et al., 1983; 
Cameron et al., 1988] and the agency approaches [Manning et al., 1981; 
Pohlmeier et al., 1995]. The former assumes that utilisation is mainly patient 
determined, although conditioned by the health-care delivery system. The 
latter emphasises the role played by the GP in deciding the frequency of 
treatment (frequency decision) though is the patient to initiate the visit 
(contact decision).  
[INSERT FIGURE 1] 
The large proportion of zeros, in turn, may be interpreted as individuals 
who either are potential users - even though they did not use primary care 
during the survey period - or do not use the service at all. As regards the 
econometric models, the negative binomial (NB) model accounts for the fact 
that all patients have a positive probability of visiting a doctor. By contrast, 
the zero-inflated models differentiate between the true no-participants 
(structural zeros) and potential participants who did not visit the GP during 
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the survey period (sampling zeros). Finally, hurdle models assume that 
excess of zeros is due to sampling zeros [Mullhay, 1986] and, accordingly, 
model the patient decision of contacting the doctor separately from the GP 
decision on the number of future encounters.  
In the analysis we apply NB regression to model the number of GP visits, vi . 
We assume that all zero observations observed in the last four weeks 
represent potential participants; therefore, the existence of unobservable 
heterogeneity is sufficient to explain excess zeros without recurring to 
different specifications such as zero inflated and hurdle models. As a 
robustness check we also estimate the probability of visiting the GP with a 
Probit model.  Notwithstanding some relevant information are lost following 
this approach, this measure might be more reliable if respondents find it 
easier to remember if they have consumed primary care services but have 
difficulties to remember the precise number of time in which they 
demanded for GP visits.  
Formally, the NB regression accounts for unobservable heterogeneity by 
adding in the conditional mean of the Poisson model an error term, 
ε ∼ ( )θθ ,G , with mean 1 and variance 1 θ  that is assumed to be 
uncorrelated with the observed xi
' : 
E vi | xi ,ε i[ ]= exp α + xi'β + ε i( )= λiδ i  
where 'ix  is a vector of regressors, iλ = exp α + x i
'β( ) and iδ = ( )iεexp . 
 The density for iδ  is given by: 
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( )if δ = ( )
( ) 1exp −−
Γ
θ
θ
δθδ
θ
θ
ii , 0≥iδ , 0>θ  
After integrating iδ  out of the joint distribution, the marginal negative 
binomial distribution is obtained [Greene, 2008]: 
Pr V = vi | xi
'  =
Γ vi +θ( )riθ 1− ri( )
vi
Γ 1+ vi( )Γ θ( )
 
where 
( )i
ir λθ
θ
+
= . 
The unobservable heterogeneity produces overdispersion while preserving 
the conditional mean:  
E vi | xi
'  = λi  
Var vi | xi
'  = λi 1+
1
θ
λi




= λi 1+κλi[ ] 
where k = Var δ i( )   
Maximum likelihood estimation of the parameters is straightforward 
[Greene, 2008]. 
The main variable of interest is the employment status (employed versus 
not-unemployed individuals) that is used in the first step of the analysis. In 
the second step, we investigate the effect of the total number of work hours 
per week to measure the opportunity costs of visiting the GP among 
workers. The total number of the employed workers is 57%.  Among them 
26% are self-employed and 7% are managers and cadres (Table 2). The 
average of work hours per week is roughly 40 (SD=12). The percentage of 
workers who work overtime (>=50 hours) is around 10.  
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Table 2 presents summary statistics for the whole sample and the sub-
sample. Several variables that influence GP visits and may also be associated 
with variables of interest are used as controls in regressions to limit the 
omitted variable problem. If workers with different health conditions self-
select in different type of occupations and jobs, estimations might be biased. 
To attenuate this kind of problem, following the existing literature, we 
include demographic and socio-economic characteristics; several measures 
of health need (self-reported health status, chronic diseases and disability); 
a lifestyle measure (smoker status); self-reported wealth1 and supply side 
variables. Controlling in particular for health status, age and a measure of 
wealth, we try to reduce biases deriving from omitted variables problem.  
The two samples differ in the proportion of females (lower in the sub-
sample (40%) respect to the whole sample (51%)) and in the proportion of 
smokers (greater in the sub-sample (52%) than in the whole sample 
(45%)). The population under study is predominantly married2, aged about 
41 years, high school educated3.  
[INSERT TABLE 2] 
3. Results 
Table 3 shows the main results from six specifications. Columns give the 
metric coefficients. They are quite stable across all specifications, both in 
sign and in order of magnitude. Table 4 reports marginal effects. Columns 1-
2 of each table report estimates from the whole sample while columns 3-6 
show findings from the sub-sample. Standard errors are adjusted for 
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clustering within households. Dummies for each Italian macro geographical 
areas are also controlled for to account for territorial and environmental 
effects and other area-specific unobservable factors4. In all specifications the 
alpha parameter is significantly different from zero (test not shown) 
confirming the presence of data over-dispersion.  
[INSERT TABLES 3, 4] 
The main findings can be summarised as follows. Employment status has a 
negative (-0.2%) but not statistically significant effect (z-score of -0.59) on 
GP visits (Column 1 in Table 2)5. This unexpected result may be due to the 
fact that the variable “employed” captures the effect of two categories of 
workers who behave differently compared to each other. For this reason, in 
Coloumn 2 we separately consider self-employed and employees. It emerges 
that self-employed visit the GP significantly less than the not-employed (-
3.2%, z-score of -6.03) while the employees are not different from not-
employed (0.6%, z-score of 1.57). 
It is likely that being self-employed workers in positions of personal 
responsibility, their opportunity costs, in terms of the reduction in earnings 
due to the loss of time from workplace, is higher. On the other hand, it is 
reasonable to believe that both employees and not-employed are unlikely to 
lose earnings due to GP visits. This may be explained by the fact that for the 
employees income losses due to illness are predominantly borne by their 
employer or by the Social Security system thanks to the sickness security 
law.  By contrast, the not-employed can manage their available time without 
specific time work constraints.  
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To further confirm this explanation using the available data, we assume that 
the total number of work hours per week may represent an adequate 
approximation of the opportunity cost of visiting the GP. We find that there 
exists an inverse association between work hours and utilisation of GP 
services (Column 3 in Table 3). For a standard deviation increase in the 
mean work hours, roughly 12, the expected number of visits per month 
decreases by a factor of exp(-0.005*12)=-0.94, holding all other variables 
constant. 
Moreover, we include an interaction term between work hours and the self-
employed status to test whether the effect of work hours on utilisation 
interacts with the type of professional condition (Column 4 in Tables 3 and 
4). The negative coefficient of the interaction term indicates a significant 
lower recourse of GP visits by the self-employed compared to the overall 
category of employees.  
 
Finally, among the category of employees we distinguish managers and 
cadres (upper-white collars) from white and blue collars (the remaining 
employees) to check whether the former behave similarly to self-employed. 
We find evidence that both the upper-white collars and the self-employed 
have a bigger negative effect on GP utilisation compared to the white and 
blue collars (Column 5 in Tables 3 and 4). Since the effects estimated are not 
so different between each other, we unify the two categories (self-
employed/managers/cadres). The negative marginal effect of the 
interaction term indicates that the slope for work hours is greater for self-
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employed/managers/cadres category compared to the white and blue-
collars, implying a higher opportunity cost of the time for the former 
(Column 6 in Tables 3 and 4). It is estimated that 10 hours increase in time 
work per week decreases the expected number of visits per month by 1.0%.  
The main results are confirmed using a Probit model. We define a dummy 
variable (Visits) that takes value one if employed see their GP one or more 
times and zero otherwise (in the last four weeks). Table 5 shows the results 
from the last and most informative specification. The results show that for 
self-employed/managers/cadres category the probability of visiting the GP 
decreases by 0.08%. It can be argued that for non-linear models the 
interaction effect cannot be evaluated simply by looking at the sign, 
magnitude, or statistical signiﬁcance of the coefficient on the interaction 
term [Ai et al, 2003]. To this purpose we use both linear probability model 
and the procedure suggested by Ai and Norton (2003) and implemented in 
STATA software to estimate significance of interaction terms and examine 
the “correct” direction of changes. The estimated effect is confirmed in sign, 
magnitude whereas statistical significance reduces from 1% to 5% (Table 
6).  
The increase in the opportunity cost of GP visits for managers and cadres 
may also be explained through the relatively widespread adoption of 
performance related pay (PRP) used to raise motivational and effort levels 
by linking wage or promotions to workers’ output. Self-employed workers 
have similar incentives, since they are the “residual claimants” of the 
produced output. Under these circumstances, it becomes more costly for 
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this type of workers to be absent from the workplace.  
These findings are related to the evidence emerging in an Italian study on 
workers’ absenteeism and incentives showing that contractual 
arrangements affect worker’s behaviour (Scoppa, 2010). In particular, the 
author finds that self-employed workers, who fully internalise the costs of 
the absenteeism, tend to be less absent than public and private employees. 
In line with the literature, being female and married is associated with 
higher demand of GP visits. The effect of age is related to the dependent 
variable through a quadratic patterns showing that as age increases, the 
expected number of primary care demand rises. The U-shaped patter 
exhibits a minimum at 42 years. Also the number of children in the 
household shows a non-linear shape with a maximum at 1.37. Fewer GP 
visits are associated with a higher education level, showing that individuals 
more educated are more efficient producers of health. Visits are clearly 
responsive to need proxied by morbidity and the self reported health status. 
Specifically, individuals reporting “fair” or “bad” health status are 
respectively associated with a higher number of visits compared to those 
claiming that their health is excellent (all the estimated effects are 
significant at the 1% level). In addition, individuals reporting chronic 
conditions use much more GP services compared to the reference category 
(subjects with no chronic condition). Surprisingly, being a smoker is not 
significantly associated with GP use. Finally, we find that wealthier 
individuals make fewer visits to the GP than less wealthy individuals and 
this is likely due to a more salubrious lifestyle. It was important to control 
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for several measures of need to prevent any bias that may occur if workers 
with different health conditions self-select in different type of occupations. 
Among aggregate variables used to correct for a possible supply-side effect a 
higher percentage of diagnostic centres is negatively and significantly 
associated with GP visits implying a substitution effects. Doctor density and 
the presence of prevention department do not have any relevant effect. 
Finally, differences in utilisation across macro geographical areas may 
reflect differences in the organisational local health system. In fact, when 
controlling for regional dummies effects (not shown) excluding supply-side 
variables we still found significant differences across Italian Regions.  
 
4. Conclusion  
This paper has attempted to investigate the empirical relationship between 
the opportunity cost of time and the demand for primary care services in 
Italy.  
After controlling for individual characteristics, social-economic variables, 
health status and supply factors, we find a significant trade-off between time 
spent in working activities and utilisation of primary care services 
depending on the type of occupation and related labour contracts. Self-
employed, managers and cadres who devote much more time at workplace 
have a lower expected number of visits to GP compared to the employees 
(white and blue collars). It might be that self-employed workers being the 
residual claimants of the produced output tend to reduce the number of 
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working hours lost. Similarly, it is likely that individual performance related 
pay schemes rise work attendance among managers and cadres even 
thought they are fully insured against sickness losses. 
We conclude that in a publicly founded regime, such as Italy, where there 
exist no financial barriers to the utilisation of primary care, type of 
occupation and time of work may still affect the demand of GP visits. Paid 
sick leave and other contractual conditions such as performance-related pay 
mechanisms and promotion systems are all possible explanations of these 
findings.  
From a policy perspective, it is desirable to improve access to primary care 
by extending GP out-of-work hours (enabling workers to be seen after work 
and at weekends) or/and reducing GP waiting times (by extending the 
practice of scheduling appointments). More generally, the health care 
system should be aware of any hidden cost imposed to the patients in terms 
of time lost at work and, consequently, should count the opportunity cost of 
patient’s time as part of the total cost of health care.  
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APPENDIX 
 
Table 1. Tabulation of GP visits, n=49,536 
GP Visits 
 Freq. Percent Cum. 
    
0 43,114 87.04 87.04 
1 4,870 9.83 96.87 
2 1,144 2.31 99.18 
3 238 0.48 99.66 
4 108 0.22 99.87 
≥5 62 0.13 100.00 
    
Total 49,536 100.00  
    
Mean 0.18   
Variance 0.31   
    
 
Figure 1. GP visits distribution, n=49,536 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics for the whole sample and for sub-sample of workers. 
 
N=86,185 n=49,536 
Variables Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Min Max Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Min Max 
Dependent variable         
Number of GP visits 0.21 0.64 0 25 0.18 0.56 0 20 
Demographic 
characteristics 
        
Fem le 0.51 0.50 0 1 0.40 0.49 0 1 
Age (yrs) 40.49 13.86 15 65 40.48 10.77 15 65 
Married 0.64 0.48 0 1 0.68 0.47 0 1 
Children (#) 0.52 0.81 0 7 0.58 0.83 0 7 
Socio-economic 
characteristics 
        
Education (yrs) 12.74 3.15 0 21 12.89 3.03 0 21 
Employed 0.58 0.49 0 1 - - - - 
Not employed 0.42 0.49 0 1 - - - - 
Employees 0.43 0.49 0 1 0.74 0.44 0 1 
Self-employed 0.15 0.35 0 1 0.26 0.44 0 1 
Managers/cadres 0.04 0.20 0 1 0.07 0.26 0 1 
Hours of work 22.87 21.65 0 99 39.80 11.92 0.5 99 
Wealth 1 0.04 0.19 0 1 0.04 0.20 0 1 
Wealth 2 0.67 0.47 0 1 0.72 0.45 0 1 
Wealth 3 0.25 0.43 0 1 0.21 0.41 0 1 
Wealth 4 0.05 0.21 0 1 0.03 0.17 0 1 
Need         
Very good health 
status 
0.22 0.42 0 1 0.22 0.41 0 1 
Good health status 0.48 0.50 0 1 0.53 0.50 0 1 
Fair health status 0.26 0.44 0 1 0.24 0.43 0 1 
Bad health status 0.03 0.16 0 1 0.01 0.12 0 1 
Very bad health status 0.00 0.07 0 1 0.00 0.04 0 1 
Chronic diseases 0.46 0.50 0 1 0.44 0.50 0 1 
Disability 0.01 0.11 0 1 0.00 0.06 0 1 
Lifestyle         
Smoker 0.45 0.50 0 1 0.52 0.50 0 1 
Supply-side         
Diagnostic centers 
(%) 
55.92 15.11 26.72 87.06 56.96 14.81 26.72 87.06 
GP Density x100,000 
pop. 
0.82 0.06 0.66 0.94 0.82 0.06 0.66 0.94 
Prevention 
departments 
89.96 15.49 40 100 90.11 15.44 40 100 
G og aphical effects         
North-West 0.20 0.40 0 1 0.22 0.41 0 1 
North-East 0.17 0.38 0 1 0.20 0.40 0 1 
Centre 0.17 0.38 0 1 0.19 0.39 0 1 
South 0.30 0.46 0 1 0.25 0.44 0 1 
Islands 0.12 0.32 0 1 0.10 0.29 0 1 
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Table 3. Determinants of GP Visits. Negative Binomial Regression Models.  
Variables 
 
Sample: Working age  
population 
Sub-sample: Employed 
       
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Employed -0.016      
 (0.026)      
Self-employed  -0.215*** -0.202*** -0.192*** -0.218***  
  (0.039) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037)  
Employees  0.043     
  (0.027)     
Hours of work†   -0.005*** -0.002 -0.000 -0.000 
   (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Self-employed*Hours of work    -0.007*** -0.009***  
    (0.003) (0.003)  
Managers/cadres     -0.214***  
     (0.063)  
Managers/cadres*Hours of work     -0.017***  
Self-employed/managers/cadres      -0.212*** 
      (0.034) 
Self-
employed/managers/cadres*Hou
rs of work 
     -0.010*** 
(0.002) 
      
Female 0.215*** 0.200*** 0.212*** 0.220*** 0.216*** 0.218*** 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.030) (0.030) (0.031) (0.030) 
Age -0.013** -0.014** -0.035*** -0.035*** -0.034*** -0.034*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Age Squared 0.000** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Married 0.106*** 0.111*** 0.115*** 0.116*** 0.116*** 0.116*** 
 (0.036) (0.036) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) 
Children (#) 0.129*** 0.130*** 0.110** 0.112** 0.115** 0.116** 
 (0.039) (0.039) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) 
Children Squared (#) -0.057*** -0.056*** -0.040** -0.041** -0.041** -0.041** 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
Education -0.005* -0.006* -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.008* -0.007* 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) 
Wealth status 2 0.113* 0.103* 0.132* 0.132* 0.123 0.125 
 (0.060) (0.060) (0.078) (0.078) (0.078) (0.078) 
Wealth status 3 0.237*** 0.221*** 0.245*** 0.245*** 0.228*** 0.229*** 
 (0.062) (0.062) (0.081) (0.081) (0.081) (0.081) 
Wealth status 4 0.253*** 0.237*** 0.307*** 0.306*** 0.289*** 0.289*** 
 (0.078) (0.078) (0.109) (0.109) (0.109) (0.109) 
Good health 0.357*** 0.354*** 0.347*** 0.348*** 0.347*** 0.347*** 
 (0.039) (0.039) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) 
Fair health 0.945*** 0.942*** 0.928*** 0.929*** 0.924*** 0.925*** 
 (0.042) (0.042) (0.052) (0.052) (0.052) (0.052) 
Bad health 1.565*** 1.561*** 1.566*** 1.570*** 1.558*** 1.562*** 
 (0.055) (0.055) (0.083) (0.083) (0.083) (0.083) 
Very bad health 1.951*** 1.953*** 1.880*** 1.868*** 1.850*** 1.848*** 
 (0.107) (0.108) (0.260) (0.257) (0.256) (0.255) 
Chronic diseases 0.613*** 0.612*** 0.568*** 0.568*** 0.572*** 0.572*** 
 (0.025) (0.025) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) 
Disability 0.197*** 0.191*** 0.016 0.017 0.007 0.008 
 (0.074) (0.074) (0.170) (0.170) (0.170) (0.170) 
Smoker 0.009 0.008 0.010 0.009 0.006 0.007 
 (0.021) (0.022) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) 
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Diagnostic centers -0.002* -0.002* -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
GP Density x 100,000 0.475* 0.467* 0.102 0.080 0.096 0.089 
 (0.267) (0.267) (0.338) (0.337) (0.338) (0.338) 
Prevention department 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
North-East 0.235*** 0.238*** 0.216*** 0.215*** 0.216*** 0.215*** 
 (0.036) (0.036) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) 
Centre 0.122*** 0.125*** 0.121** 0.122** 0.120** 0.121** 
 (0.038) (0.038) (0.049) (0.048) (0.049) (0.049) 
South 0.165*** 0.169*** 0.110*** 0.110*** 0.103** 0.105** 
 (0.031) (0.031) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) 
Islands 0.224*** 0.230*** 0.088 0.089 0.082 0.084 
 (0.053) (0.053) (0.073) (0.073) (0.073) (0.073) 
Alpha 2.263 2.251 2.265 2.260 2.254 2.254 
 0.069 0.069 0.099 0.099 0.099 0.099 
 (0.031) (0.031) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) 
Constant -3.122*** -3.107*** -2.027*** -2.013*** -2.062*** -2.066*** 
 (0.263) (0.262) (0.355) (0.355) (0.355) (0.356) 
Observations 86185 86185 49536 49536 49536 49536 
Pseudo R-squared -43379.50 -43346.07 -23041.12 -23037.26 -23026.33 -23027.51 
Notes Negative Binomial metric coefficients. The dependent variable is GP Visits. Clustered (at household level) and 
robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The symbols ***, **, * indicate that coefficients are statistically 
significant, respectively, at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level.  
†
 Hours worked variable is mean centered. The omitted categories are male, never married, very good health status, 
wealthier, no chronic diseases, no disabilities, no smoker in all regressions. As for the employment status, the 
omitted categories are: the not-employed in the overall sample; the employees (columns 3-4) and white and blue- 
collars employees (columns 5-6) in the sub-sample.  
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Table 4. Determinants of GP Visits. Negative Binomial Regression Models (Marginal Effects). 
Variables 
 
Sample: Working age 
population 
 
 
Sub-sample: Employed  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Employed -0.003      
 (0.004)      
Self-employed  -0.032*** -0.028*** -0.027*** -0.030***  
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)  
Employees  0.007     
  (0.004)     
Hours of work†   -0.001*** -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Self-employed*Hours of work    -0.001*** 
(0.000) 
-0.001*** 
(0.000) 
 
     
Managers/cadres     -0.029***  
     (0.008)  
Managers/cadres*Hours of 
work 
    -0.002*** 
(0.001) 
 
      
Self-
employed/managers/cadres 
     -0.030*** 
(0.005) 
      
Self-
employed/managers/cadres*
Hours of work 
     -0.001*** 
(0.000) 
      
Female 0.035*** 0.032*** 0.032*** 0.033*** 0.032*** 0.033*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Age -0.002** -0.002** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Age Squared 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Married 0.017*** 0.018*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Children (#) 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.016** 0.016** 0.017** 0.017** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Children Squared (#) -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.006** -0.006** -0.006** -0.006** 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Education -0.001* -0.001* -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.001* -0.001* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Wealth status 2 0.018* 0.016* 0.019* 0.019* 0.018 0.018 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Wealth status 3 0.041*** 0.038*** 0.039*** 0.039*** 0.036*** 0.036*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
Wealth status 4 0.046*** 0.043*** 0.052** 0.052** 0.049** 0.049** 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
Good health 0.058*** 0.058*** 0.051*** 0.051*** 0.050*** 0.050*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Fair health 0.198*** 0.196*** 0.180*** 0.180*** 0.178*** 0.179*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
Bad health 0.586*** 0.581*** 0.543*** 0.545*** 0.536*** 0.539*** 
 (0.039) (0.039) (0.055) (0.055) (0.054) (0.055) 
Very bad health 0.966*** 0.965*** 0.812*** 0.800*** 0.782*** 0.780*** 
 (0.119) (0.120) (0.249) (0.242) (0.237) (0.236) 
Chronic diseases 0.103*** 0.102*** 0.087*** 0.087*** 0.088*** 0.088*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Disability 0.035** 0.034** 0.002 0.003 0.001 0.001 
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 (0.014) (0.014) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) 
Smoker 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Diagnostic centers -0.000* -0.000* -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
GP Density x100,000 0.077* 0.075* 0.015 0.012 0.014 0.013 
 (0.043) (0.043) (0.050) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049) 
Prevention department 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
North-East 0.041*** 0.041*** 0.034*** 0.034*** 0.034*** 0.034*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Centre 0.020*** 0.021*** 0.018** 0.019** 0.018** 0.018** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
South 0.028*** 0.028*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.015** 0.016** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Islands 0.040*** 0.040*** 0.013 0.014 0.012 0.013 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) 
Observations 86185 86185 49536 49536 49536 49536 
Notes: The dependent variable is GP Visits. Cluster (at household level) and robust standard errors are reported 
in parentheses. The symbols ***, **, * indicate that coefficients are statistically significant, respectively, at the 1, 
5, and 10 percent level.  
†
 Hours worked variable is mean centered.  
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Table 5. Determinants of GP Visits. Probit estimates (Marginal Effects). 
Variables 
 
Sub-sample: Employed 
 
  
Self-employed/managers/cadres -0.024*** 
 (0.003) 
Hours of work† -0.000 
 (0.000) 
Self-employed/managers/cadres*Hours of work -0.001*** 
 (0.000) 
Female 0.022*** 
 (0.003) 
Age -0.004*** 
 (0.001) 
Age Squared 0.000*** 
 (0.000) 
Married 0.015*** 
 (0.004) 
Children (#) 0.010** 
 (0.005) 
Children Squared (#) -0.004* 
 (0.002) 
Education -0.000 
 (0.000) 
Wealth status 2 0.012 
 (0.008) 
Wealth status 3 0.023** 
 (0.009) 
Wealth status 4 0.022 
 (0.013) 
Good Health 0.038*** 
 (0.004) 
Fair Health 0.115*** 
 (0.007) 
Bad Health 0.265*** 
 (0.021) 
Very bad Health 0.233*** 
 (0.057) 
Chronic diseases 0.062*** 
 (0.003) 
Disability 0.005 
 (0.023) 
Smoker -0.000 
 (0.003) 
Diagnostic centers -0.000* 
 (0.000) 
GP Density x100,000 -0.017 
 (0.037) 
Prevention department 0.000 
 (0.000) 
North-East 0.024*** 
 (0.005) 
Centre 0.011** 
 (0.005) 
South -0.002 
 (0.004) 
Islands 0.003 
 (0.008) 
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Observations 49536 
Pseudo R-squared -18074.604 
Notes: The dependent variable is set to 1 if individuals visit the GP at least 
once, 0 otherwise. Cluster (at household level) and robust standard errors 
are reported in parentheses. The symbols ***, **, * indicate that coefficients 
are statistically significant, respectively, at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level.  
†
 Hours worked variable is mean centered.  
 
 
Table 6. Interaction effect, n=49,536. 
  Mean SE Z-
statistics 
Probit  Marginal Effect -0.001 0.000 -2.88 
Ai and Norton procedure  Marginal Effect -0.001 0.000 -2.51 
Linear probability model 
(LPM)  
Coefficient -0.001 0.000 -2.22 (t-
statistic) 
     
 
 
                                                                    
1 Wealth categories are defined as follows: 1 for the wealthier wealth status; 2 for middle 
wealth status; 3 for bad wealth status; 4 for poorer wealth status. 
2 Married is set to zero if the individual has never got married, is widowed, separated or 
divorced. 
3 Education is set at zero for no educational qualification; 5 for elementary school; 8 for 
middle school; 11 for some high school; 13 for high school; 18 for university; 20 for 
postgraduate qualification. 
4 North-West includes the following regions: Piedmont, Valle d’Aosta, Lombardy, Liguria; 
North-East includes Veneto, Trentino Alto Adige, Friuli Venezia Giulia, Emilia Romagna; 
Centre includes Tuscany, Lazio, Marche, Umbria; South includes Abruzzi, Campania, Apulia, 
Molise, Basilicata, Calabria; Islands include Sicily and Sardinia. 
5 In a previous specification (not shown) including only the unemployed as a reference 
group, we do not find a statistically significant difference between the individuals out of the 
labour force and the unemployed. 
